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Potential demand for hedging by Australian
wheat producers{
Phil Simmons and Alicia Rambaldi*
The potential for hedging Australian wheat with the new Sydney Futures
Exchange wheat contract is examined using a theoretical hedging model para-
metised from previous studies. The optimal hedging ratio for an `average' wheat
farmer was found to be zero under reasonable assumptions about transaction
costs and based on previously published measures of risk aversion. The estimated
optimal hedging ratios were found by simulation to be quite sensitive to assump-
tions about the degree of risk aversion. If farmers are signi®cantly more risk
averse than is currently believed, then there is likely to be an active interest in the
new futures market.
1. Introduction
Historically, the Australian wheat industry has been exposed to high levels
of price and production risk. Price per tonne received by growers over the
last ®ve years varied between A$132 and A$212 and national average yields
over the same period varied between 1.11 and 1.97 tonnes per hectare
(ABARE 1995). Price variability is caused by unstable world supply, the
inelastic nature of demand and protection by governments of consumers
and producers in important markets. Yield variability for Australian
producers arises primarily from climatic risk and, as indicated by wide
swings in national averages, tends to be highly correlated across producers.
There is only limited scope for the management of either production or
price risk. Other grain crops are subject to the same climatic risk and, as
close substitutes for wheat in both production and consumption, face
similar price risks. The traditional form of production diversi®cation is
wool. Since the late 1960s and early 1970s there has been a steady increase
in area planted to coarse grains, legumes and oilseeds re¯ecting increased
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absence of speci®c research, it is not clear whether this development repres-
ents a desire to diversify risk or a response to changes in relative prices.
The scope for management of price risk is also limited. Futures markets
exist overseas, however, there is no evidence that Australian wheat growers
have made use of them. Indirect use of these markets has occurred through
Australian Wheat Board hedging activities. However, this type of activity
has been small relative to the size of the harvest.
Bond, Thompson and Geldard (1985) examined the potential for
hedging Australian wheat on the Chicago market by the Board and found
that basis risk would be a signi®cant deterrent to such trade. Basis risk
occurs when futures and spot prices dier because of quality dierences
between farm produce and futures contract speci®cation and the stochastic
nature of these dierences increases risks associated with hedging. Perkins,
Sniekers and Geldard (1984) argued that basis risk makes hedging of
Australian wheat on the Chicago futures market too risky and that the
Kansas City market, trading hard red winter wheat, could be a more
appropriate venue.
Price risk has also been managed through lobbying of government for
favourable commercial policies. However, microeconomic reform has
removed much of the legislation in this area over the last decade (Whitwell
and Sydenham 1991). Virtually the only commercial policy remaining that
may be favourable to price stabilisation is the export monopoly of the
Australian Wheat Board. This monopoly, through its scale of operation,
may result in economies in hedging and forward selling of Australian
wheat in foreign markets. Approximately 80 per cent of the harvest is
exported (ABARE 1995).
In April 1996 a new wheat futures contract was introduced at the
Sydney Futures Exchange. The contract size is 50 tonnes (one truckload)
and is for Australian Standard White wheat with a minimum of 9 per cent
protein based on 11 per cent moisture. The new wheat contract is designed
to meet the speci®c hedging needs of Australian growers and hence basis
risk should be low. The contract is based on physical delivery rather than
`cash settlement' and maturity dates may be up to 18 months ahead of the
spot month. Contracts mature in the months of January, March, July,
September and November. This new market has the potential to play an
important role in the management of price risk in Australian wheat
production.
In section 2 a theoretical model of the optimal hedging rule for the
Australian wheat market is developed. The model is in the spirit of
previous work by Telser (1955), Heifner (1972) and Peck (1975), however,
the framework has been adapted to provide an improved treatment of
P. Simmons and A. Rambaldi 158
# Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1997production risk and to include explicit costs of hedging. In section 3 an
empirical analysis is conducted to identify `in principle' grower interest in
a futures market. The values of the coecients in the theoretical model
were obtained from previously published work and the model was used to
forecast optimal hedging ratios under a range of assumptions about trans-
action costs and risk aversion. Conclusions are presented in section 4.
2. Theoretical model
It was assumed that wheat growers' expected utility could be described
using the expected value of, and the unanticipated variation in, wheat
pro®ts. Let E(U) be expected utility, E(p) expected pro®t and k the Pratt
(1964) coecient of absolute risk aversion:
k
E(U)=E ( p )±ÐE [(p ± E(p))
2]. (1)
2
The function is a member of a general class (E±V) of utility functions that
can be viewed as second order approximations to more complex (and
presumably more realistic) forms. All the previous research on hedging
reviewed for this study was based on quadratic utility functions except
Telser (1955), who used a safety-®rst rule, and Grant (1985), who used a
general utility function. Grant (1985) focused on the optimal level of
hedging when farmers, viewed collectively, are price makers.
1 Issues
associated with the E±V framework are discussed in Markowitz (1959),
Tsiang (1972), Anderson, Dillon and Hardaker (1977) and others and, in
the context of hedging, in Peck (1975) and Newbery and Stiglitz (1981).
Production occurs within a one-year cycle so that producers maximise
utility in period t conditional on information available in period t±1:
k
Et±1(Ut)=E t ±1(pt)±ÐE t ±1[(pt ±E t ±1(pt))
2]. (2)
2
Prices were assumed to follow a naõÈve expectations model with a multiplic-
ative error term where u1t is a random variable with zero mean and
variance of s
2
1:
pt = pt±1(1+u1t) (3)
It was necessary to make the simplifying assumption that prices are
normally distributed so that the mean variance utility framework could be
used. We assumed that proportional changes in price over time were
1Newbery and Stiglitz (1981) showed that a hedge ratio of one was sub-optimal when
farmers, because they share the same risks, have an inverse relationship between their
individual outputs and realised prices. Grant (1985) increased the generality of this result.
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commonly used speci®cation with additive errors where price changes are
assumed to be independent of the level of prices. However, we acknowl-
edge the point made by one reviewer that the distribution of prices is
ultimately an empirical question.
Realised production was speci®ed as:
qt = AtYt (4)
where At is area sown in t±1 resulting in the area of wheat in t, and Yt is
yield per hectare. The equation for yield was assumed to have a similar
functional form to the equation for price. However, the equation was
speci®ed with a linear trend, T, to capture improvements in crop
husbandry over time. Both equations (4) and (5) are used below in the
equation for expected pro®t and the incorporation of the trend was
necessary so that the latter equation could have empirical content. The
trend variable also allows greater generality since it allows the eect of
improved crop productivity on the optimal hedging ratio to be considered.
Yt =( d+eT)(1+u2t). (5)
u2t is a random variable with zero mean and variance of s
2
2. The Austra-
lian wheat industry contributes less than 3 per cent of world supply,
therefore growers are price takers both individually and collectively. Hence
u1t and u2t are assumed to be independent so that Et-1(u1t, u2t)=0 .
Remembering that At is known in period t±1, planned production is:
qt = At(d+eT). (6)
Using h to denote the quantity hedged, fp the futures price in t-1 for a
futures contract maturing in t and tc transaction costs, total pro®ts are:
pt = pt±1(1+u1t)qt(1+u2t)±a±b q t±c q t
2+h (fp ± pt±1(1+u1t)±tc).
(7)
Thus, wheat pro®ts are revenue minus costs where costs are assumed to be
a quadratic function of planned production. This treatment of costs
involves two simpli®cations. First, cost savings from failed production are
ignored. This is reasonable given that low yielding crops may be as costly
to harvest as high yielding crops. The second simpli®cation is the
quadratic form which can be viewed as a second order approximation to
any higher order dierentiable cost function. Hedging pro®ts or losses are
the dierence between the futures price in t±1 and realised price in t minus
transaction costs all multiplied by quantity hedged. Conditional expected
pro®ts are:
Et±1(pt)=p t ±1qt ±a±b q t±c q t
2+h ( fp ± pt±1 ± tc). (8)
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Et±1(Ut)=p t ±1qt ±a±b q t±c q t
2+h ( f p±p±t c ) (9)
k
±Ðp
2
t ±1[(qt ±h )
2E t ±1(u
2
1t)+q t
2E t±1(u
2
2t+u
2
1tu
2
2t)]
2
Following Kahl (1983), decisions about the amount to produce and the
amount to hedge are made simultaneously implying two ®rst order condi-
tions:
dEt±1(Ut)
ÐÐÐÐ = pt±1 ± b±2 cqt ±k p
2
t ±1((qt ±h ) E t ±1(u
2
1t)+
dq t
q tE t±1(u
2
2t+u
2
1tu
2
2t)) = 0 (10)
and
dEt±1(Ut)
ÐÐÐÐ = fp ± pt±1 ± t+kp
2
t±1(qt ±h ) E t ±1(u
2
1t) = 0. (11)
dh
Equations 10 and 11 are solved simultaneously for planned production and
quantity hedged:
pt±1 ± b+(fp ± pt±1)±tc
qt= ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ (12)
2c+kp
2
t±1Et±1(u
2
2t+u
2
1tu
2
2t)
(fp ± pt±1)±tc
h=q t+ÐÐÐÐÐÐ . (13)
kp
2
t±1Et±1(u
2
1t)
Thus, planned production increases with expected price and declines with
production and price risk. (For very high values of k, the supply curve could
tilt backwards because of the squared price term in the denominator,
however, previous estimates of k are extremely small.) Newbery and Stiglitz
(1981, p.82) show that under special circumstances, when the coecient of
relative risk-aversion is constant, increased risk may cause highly risk-averse
individuals to increase eort to avoid worst possible contingencies. This
may mean that increased risk results in higher levels of planned production.
This eect is not captured with the utility function used in this study.
Price risk only has a relatively small in¯uence on planned production
compared to the unhedged planning position (see equation 18 below). This
re¯ects that most price risk is now covered by the hedge. Intuitively, the
remaining in¯uence of price risk results from the possibility that losses in
the futures market cannot be oset by gains in the physical market
because of a crop loss. Hence, price risk continues to be important
through its interaction with production risk even when the farmer has `full
cover' in the futures market.
As futures market transaction costs increase, both planned production
and the size of the hedge decline. The ®rst right-hand side term in 13, qt,
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and if the futures price was unbiased and hence equivalent to the produc-
tion planning price. In this situation `insurance' is free and risk-averse
growers have full cover regardless of the magnitude of the risk coecient
(Kahl 1983). From the second RHS term in 13, growers take less than full
cover when transactions costs are positive, futures markets are biased
against them due to, say, a risk premium, or when there is basis risk.
Newbery and Stiglitz (1981) argue that fp±p may also be interpreted as a
speculative term when the hedger believes that he or she has superior
information about future prices.
Keynes's (1927) theory of normal backwardation shows that if hedgers
are predominantly short and underwriters are predominantly long, then a
risk premium may emerge in the market and reduce futures prices.
However, Newbery and Stiglitz (1981) examined the empirical evidence for
bias in agricultural futures markets and concluded that the evidence was
mixed. The new futures market in wheat is likely to be used by both short
and long hedgers in as yet unknown proportions and hence the direction
of any bias, if it were to emerge, cannot be predicted.
Another scenario where growers take less than full cover is where they
are `price makers'. Grant (1985) has shown that if production risk is
correlated across producers and when the industry, viewed as a whole, can
in¯uence prices, then a perfect hedge is likely to be sub-optimal. For the
case of Australian wheat, stochastic production is likely to be correlated
across growers because of the geographical distribution of rainfall.
However, with less than 3 per cent of world production, the industry is
unlikely to be in¯uential in determining world prices (ABARE 1995).
From our perspective, the important question is whether transaction
costs, including direct costs of communicating and transacting, and
indirect costs of learning and adopting a new marketing strategy, make
futures markets `too costly'.
3. Empirical results
The model was then speci®ed without a futures market so that elasticities
from previous studies could be used to obtain parameters that could be
used in simulation. Pro®ts were rewritten as:
pt =p t ±1(1+u1t)qt(1+u2t)±a±b q t±c q t
2 (14)
and conditionally expected pro®ts as:
Et±1(pt)=p t ±1qt ±a±b q t±cqt
2. (15)
Substituting 14 and 15 into 2, conditional expected utility was:
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Et±1(Ut)=p t ±1qt ±a±b q t±c q t
2±Ðq t
2 p
2
t ±1Et±1[u
2
1t+u
2
2t+u
2
1tu
2
2t]. (16)
2
This was maximised with respect to the decision variable, planned produc-
tion:
qEt±1(Ut)
ÐÐÐÐ = pt±1 ±b±q t (2c+kp
2
t±1Et±1[u
2
1t+u
2
2t+u
2
1tu
2
2t]) = 0 (17)
qqt
which was solved for planned production, qt:
±b+pt±1 qt = ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ (18)
2c+kp
2
t±1Et±1[u
2
1t+u
2
2t+u
2
1tu
2
2t]
Thus, as with the hedging model, increases in the coecient of absolute
risk aversion, k, or `noise' arising from prices or climate reduce the level of
planned production.
The residuals from estimates of 5 and 3 (discussed below) were found to
be homoscedastic and hence the squared error terms were assumed to be
constant over time. For simulation purposes, these were viewed as sample
variances.
Mean values of price, area and yield for the period 1990±91 to 1994±95
(with prices in¯ated to 1994±95 values using the Consumer Price Index)
were calculated using data from ABARE (1995). These values are reported
in table 1. The values of s
2
1 and s
2
2 were calculated using data on price and
yield from 1955±56 to 1994±95 from ABARE (1994) and ABARE (1995).
The value of s
2
1 was obtained from 5 using a spread sheet and d and e, from
7, were estimated with regression analysis (see table 2). Equation 7 was then
used to calculate s
2
2. The values of s
2
1 and s
2
2 are reported in table 1.
The key parameters were c and k, since these values are of central
importance in the hedging decision. They were obtained using previously
published estimates of the coecient of absolute risk aversion and of the
elasticity of supply. It was then possible to calculate b as a residual using
the variable values described above.
Table 1 Mean values of model variables
Variable Mean value
Pt±1 $204/tonne
At 8482 hectares
Yt 1.59 tonnes/hectare
s
2
1 0.040
s
2
2 0.062
Source: The model was `parametised' using mean values
for price, area and yield between 1990±91 and 1994±95.
The variance terms were derived using regression analysis
as described in the text.
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respect to own price were reviewed and divided into two groups loosely
termed `more rigorous' and `less rigorous'. Of the ®ve studies in the `more
rigorous' group, Vincent, Dixon and Powell (1980), McKay, Lawrence and
Vlastuin (1982), Fisher and Wall (1990) and Johnson, Powell and Dixon
(1990) had supply elasticities that were clustered in a range between 0.46
and 0.77. The mean of this cluster was 0.60 which was used as the basis
for calculation of c in our model.
Only two studies reporting coecients of risk aversion for Australian
farmers were found. The results reported by Bond and Wonder (1980)
were preferred as a basis for obtaining a value for k over those of Bardsley
and Harris (1987) which was `too pioneering' in its approach for our
purposes. The elicitation technique in Bond and Wonder (1980) has been
used extensively in previously published work.
The values for A (Bond and Wonder (1980), table 3) and information on
hypothetical income levels (Bond and Wonder (1980), Appendix 1) were
used to measure k. In the ®rst step, their A values were converted to coe-
cients of absolute risk aversion by multiplying them by ±2. In the second
step, the coecients obtained in step 1 were converted to coecients of
relative risk aversion by multiplying by income levels obtained from the
Appendix. In step three, these values were averaged and then divided by
the expected income level from our study. This provided the value of the
coecient of absolute risk aversion, k, relevant to our study. The coe-
cient of absolute risk aversion used in this study was 9.633E-8 (see table
2). This corresponded to a coecient of relative risk aversion of 0.265
after removing the eects of income.
The values of the elasticity of supply and coecient of absolute risk
aversion were used with the values of the variables and 18 to calculate c
directly and b as a residual (see table 2). The coecients and variable
Table 2 Model parameters
Coecient Value
b 117.617
c 0.0117
d 1.000
e 0.0124
k 9.633E-8
Source: The model parameters were based on pub-
lished measures of the elasticity of supply and co-
ecient of absolute risk aversion and on regression
results for yield and trend in yield.
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hedging ratios could be obtained through simulation.
Farmers incur a variety of direct costs other than brokerage when
hedging including interest payments on margin calls and communication
charges. However, on a per tonne basis, these charges are relatively small
and aggregate direct costs are likely to be around A$5 per tonne
depending on the scale of the hedging operation.
Simulation of 12 and 13 using transaction costs of A$5 per tonne
resulted in a hedge ratio of zero. As shown in ®gure 1, the hedge ratio
approaches zero when transaction costs reach A$2.15 per tonne. Since
some farmers will have greater than average risk aversion, some hedging
may still occur, however, an `average' farmer will not sell contracts for
hedging purposes. An average hedge ratio of zero is consistent with casual
observation and surveys of farmer participation in futures markets. Berck
(1981) reports that futures markets are not used by 95 per cent of
American farmers.
The only contentious value used in our simulation was the coecient of
absolute risk aversion. Thus, a sensitivity analysis was conducted in which
the analysis was repeated for alternative values of the coecient of
Figure 1 Optimal hedging ratios with a range of transaction costs
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ten to 9.63E-7 and then reduced below our initial value for k of 9.63E-8 to
9.63E-9. The model coecients were recalculated and the simulations
undertaken across a range of transaction costs. Increasing k to 9.63E-7
with transaction costs of A$5 per tonne resulted in a hedge ratio of 0.81
(see ®gure 2). This indicated a relatively high degree of sensitivity in our
conclusions to changes in the degree of risk aversion. When k was reduced
by a factor of ten, the hedge ratio remained zero.
4. Conclusions
Our results show that, under reasonable assumptions about transaction
costs, and based on previously published results for risk aversion, there is
unlikely to be signi®cant interest from Australian wheat growers in the
new futures contract. However, some caution in interpreting this result is
in order. First, the results are sensitive to assumptions about the degree of
risk aversion and the integrity of the results hinges on the results reported
in Bond and Wonder (1980). As indicated by the sensitivity analysis, if
farmers are, on average, more risk averse than we have assumed, then
Figure 2 Sensitivity analysis of optimal hedging ratios
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(1980) reported that risk aversion was likely to show a high level of variab-
ility across Australian broad-acre farming industries. It was not possible to
derive the variance of our k from the information in Bond and Wonder
(1980), however, their reported standard errors indicate a high level of
variability. Thus, while interest on average in the contract is likely to be
zero, our results are consistent with a proportion of the industry with
above-average risk aversion making use of the contract. The third
cautionary note is that our assumptions about transaction costs do not
include indirect costs associated with learning or with overcoming
prejudice against new entry to futures markets. If such indirect costs were
large, then the optimal hedging ratio could be considerably smaller even
for farmers who were very risk averse. However, it is not clear what price
should, or even could, be placed on learning and overcoming prejudice.
This is a topic for further research.
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